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EDITOR'S NOTE 
MODERN WAR AND MODERN LAW 
David Kennedy is the Manley O. Hudson Professor of Law at 
Harvard Law School, where he teaches international law, 
international economic policy, legal theory, law and development 
and European law. He joined the faculty in 1981 after teaching in 
Germany. He holds a Ph.D. in international affairs from the 
Fletcher School at Tufts University and a J.D. from Harvard. He is 
the author of numerous articles on international law, history and 
legal theory, and founder of the New Approaches to International 
Law project. 
Professor Kennedy's research uses interdisciplinary materials 
from sociology and social theory, economics and history to explore 
issues of global governance, development policy and the nature of 
professional expertise. He is particularly interested in the politics 
of the transnational regime for economic policy making. Kennedy 
has been particularly committed to developing new voices from the 
third world and among women in international affairs. 
As a practicing lawyer and consultant, Professor Kennedy has 
worked on numerous international projects, both commercial and 
public, including work with the United Nations, the Commission 
of the European Union and with the private firm of Cleary, 
Gottlieb, Steen and Hamilton in Brussels. His work with Cleary, 
Gottlieb, Steen and Hamilton combined European antitrust 
litigation, government relations advising and general corporate 
law. 
Professor Kennedy's speech, "Modem War and Modem Law," 
was delivered at the John and Frances Angelos Law Center, 
University of Baltimore School of Law, on October 26, 2006. In 
his speech, Professor Kennedy offers theories about the modem 
day partnership of war and law. 
171 
MODERN WAR AND MODERN LAW 
David Kennedy 
Manley O. Hudson Professor of Law, Harvard Law School 
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Abstract: Warfare has become a legal institution. Law organizes 
and disciplines the military, defines the bdttlespace, privileges 
killing the enemy, and offers a common language to debate the 
legitimacy of waging war-down to the tactics of particular battle. 
At the same time, law is no longer a matter of firm distinctions-
combatant and non-combatant, war and peace. It has become a 
flexible and strategic partner for both the military and for 
humanitarians seeking to restrain the violence of warfare. The 
relationship between modern war and modern law is made all the 
more complex by today's asymmetric conflicts, and by the loss of a 
shared vision about what the law means and how it should be 
applied. Nevertheless, when law works well, it can be a strategic 
ally and provide a framework for talking across cultures about the 
justice and efficacy of wartime violence. When it works poorly, all 
parties feel their cause is just and no one feels responsible for the 
deaths and suffering of war. Professor David Kennedy explores 
how good legal arguments can make people lose their moral 
compass and sense of responsibility for the violence of war. 
INTRODUCTION 
Many thanks. It is a pleasure to be here and I'd like to thank 
Professor Tim Sellers, and the University of Baltimore School of 
Law for the opportunity. 
The wars of my time and my country-the America of the 
"postwar" half-century-have been varied. We have fought a Cold 
War, postcolonial wars, and innumerable metaphoric wars on 
things like "poverty" and "drugs." Our military has intervened here 
and there for various humanitarian and strategic reasons. The 
current War on Terror partakes of all these. When framed as a 
clash of civilizations or modes of life-secular and fundamentalist, 
Christian and Muslim, modem and primitive-the War on Terror 
is reminiscent of the Cold War. 
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Like the Cold War, the War on Terror seems greater than the 
specific conflicts fought in its name. It transcends the clash of arms 
in Iraq or Afghanistan. On their own, those wars resemble 
postcolonial and anticolonial conflicts from Algeria to Vietnam. 
When we link the war in Afghanistan to women's rights or the war 
in Iraq to the establishment of democracy, we evoke the history of 
military deployment for humanitarian ends. 
In our broader political culture, the phrase "war on terror" 
echoes the wars on drugs and poverty as the signal of an 
administration's political energy and focus. At the same time, the 
technological asymmetries of battling suicide bombers with 
precision guided missiles and satellite tracking has made this War 
on Terror seem something new-as has the amorphous nature of 
the enemy: dispersed, loosely coordinated groups of people or 
individuals imitating one another, spurring each other to action, 
within the most and the least developed societies alike. 
Strictly speaking, of course, terror is a tactic, not an enemy. 
The word is a way of stigmatizing the use of deadly force for 
political objectives by non-state actors of which one does not 
approve. When we say we are fighting a "war on terror," we not 
only disparage the tactic and those who use it; we also condense all 
these recollections of prior wars into a single term, situating this 
struggle in our own recent history of warfare. The phrase frames 
our broader project with fear, and marks our larger purpose as that 
of reason against unreason, principle against passion, the sanity of 
our commercial present against the irrationality of an imaginary 
past. In this picture, we defend civilization itself against what 
came before, what stands outside, and what, if we are not vigilant, 
may well come after. 
It is not novel to frame a war in the rhetoric of distinction-us 
versus them, good versus evil-nor to evoke a nation's history of 
warfare each time its soldiers are again deployed. When the 
American administration calls what we are doing "war," they mean 
to stress its discontinuity from the normal routines of peacetime. 
War is different. To go to war means that a decision has been 
taken: the soldier has triumphed over the peacemaker, the sword 
over the pen, the party of war over the party of peace. Differences 
among us are now to be set aside, along with the normal budgetary 
constraints of peacetime. This is serious and important-a time of 
extraordinary powers and political deference, of sacrifice, and 
national purpose. 
Increasingly, these distinctions-war and peace, civilian and 
combatant, terror and crime-have come to be written in legal 
terms. And they are coming unglued. War and peace are far more 
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continuous with one another than our rhetorical habits would 
suggest. Should we have responded to September 11 th as an 
attack--or as a terrible crime? Are the prisoners at Guantanamo 
Bay enemy combatants, criminals, or something altogether 
different? These are partly questions of tactic and strategy, about 
the appropriate balance between our criminal justice system and 
our military in the struggle to make the United States secure. But 
these are also questions of political and legal interpretation. We 
can imagine a spectrum of positions, from insistence that the 
country remain on a war footing, at home and abroad, to the view 
that we treat the problem of suicide bombing or terrorist attacks as 
a routine cost of doing business, a risk to be managed, a crime to 
be prevented or aggressively prosecuted. The boundary between 
war and peace or terror and crime, has become something we argue 
about, as much or more than something we cross. Law has built 
practical and rhetorical bridges between war and peace, just as it 
has become the rhetoric through which we debate and assert the 
boundaries of warfare. 
This afternoon, I'd like to step back from these immediate 
controversies, to explore three ideas. 
First, modem war as a legal institution. Law has crept into the 
war machine. The battlespace is as legally regulated as the rest of 
modem life. Once a bit player in military conflict, law now shapes 
the institutional, logistical, and physical landscape of war. No 
longer standing outside judging and channeling the use of force, 
law has infiltrated the military profession, and become-for parties 
on all sides of even the most asymmetric confrontations-a 
political and ethical vocabulary for marking legitimate power and 
justifiable death. 
Second, the surprising fluidity of modem law. International law 
is no longer an affair of clear rules and sharp distinctions. Law 
today rarely speaks clearly, or with a single voice. Its influence is 
subtle, its rules plural. Legality is almost always a matter of more 
or less-and legal legitimacy is in the eye of the beholder. Indeed, 
as law became an ever more important yardstick for legitimacy, 
legal categories became far too spongy to permit clear resolution of 
the most important questions--or became spongy enough to 
undergird the experience of self-confident outrage by parties on all 
sides of a conflict. 
And third, I'd like to explore the opportunities and dangers 
opened up by this strange partnership of modem war and modern 
law. There are new strategic possibilities for both military 
professionals and for humanitarians seeking to limit the violence of 
warfare. When things go well, law can provide a framework for 
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talking across cultures about the justice and efficacy of wartime 
violence. More often, I am afraid, the modem partnership of war 
and law leaves all parties feeling their cause is just and no one 
feeling responsible for the deaths and suffering of war. Good legal 
arguments can make people lose their moral compass and sense of 
responsibility for the violence of war. 
I. MODERN WAR AS A LEGAL INSTITUTION 
It is now commonplace to observe that the Second World 
War-a "total" war, in which the great powers mobilized vast 
armies and applied the full industrial and economic resources of 
their nation to the defeat and occupation of enemy states-is no 
longer the prototype. Experts differ about what is most significant 
in the wars that have followed. 
Wars are rarely fought between equivalent nations or coalitions 
of great industrial powers. They occur at the peripheries of the 
world system, among foes with wildly different institutional, 
economic, and military capacities. The military trains for tasks far 
from conventional combat: local diplomacy, intelligence gathering, 
humanitarian reconstruction, urban policing, or managing the 
routine tasks of local government. It is even less clear where the 
war begins and ends-or which activities are combat, which are 
"peace building." 
Enemies are dispersed and decisive engagement is rare. Battle 
is at once intensely local and global in new ways. Violence 
follows patterns more familiar from epidemiology or cultural 
fashion than military strategy. Networks of fellow travelers exploit 
the infrastructures of the global economy to bring force to bear 
here and there. Satellite systems guide precision munitions from' 
deep in Missouri to the outskirts of Kabul. The political, cultural, 
and diplomatic components of warfare have become more salient. 
And, of course, the whole thing happens in the glare of the modem 
media. 
But what does it mean to say that war has also become a legal 
institution-that war is the continuation of law by other means? 
Not that everyone always follows the rules-or that everyone 
agrees on what the rules are or how they should be interpreted. 
But the media coverage of violations and interpretive differences 
could throw us off the track-leading us to underestimate the place 
of law in modem warfare. After all, the identification of violations 
also isolates the bad apples from the killing law privileges. 
Law no longer stands outside conflict, marking its boundaries or 
limiting its means. Military operations take place against a 
complex tapestry of local and national rules. Laws shape the 
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institutional, logistical-even physical-landscape on which 
military operations occur. International law has become the metric 
for debating the legitimacy of military action. And in all these 
ways, law now shapes the politics of war. 
War is a legal institution first because it has become a 
professional practice. Today's military is linked to the nation's 
commercial life, integrated with civilian and peacetime 
governmental institutions, and covered by the same national and 
international media. Officers discipline their force and organize 
their operations with rules. 
Some years ago, before the current war in Iraq, I spent some 
days on board the USS Independence in the Persian Gulf-nothing 
was as striking about the military culture I encountered there than 
its intensely regulated feel. Five thousand sailors, thousands of 
miles from base, managing complex technologies and weaponry, 
constant turnover and flux. It was absolutely clear that even if I 
could afford to buy an aircraft carrier, I couldn't operate it-the 
carrier, like the military, is a social system, requiring a complex 
and entrenched culture of standard practices and shared 
experiences, rules and discipline. 
War is a complex organizational endeavor, whose management 
places law at the center of military operations. Law structures 
logistics, command and control, and the interface with all the 
institutions, public and private, that must be coordinated for 
military operations to succeed. At least in principle, no ship 
moves, no weapon is fired, no target selected without review for 
compliance with regulation. This is less the mark of a military 
gone soft, than the indication that there is simply no other way to 
make modem warfare work, internally or externally. Warfare has 
become rule and regulation. 
Mobilizing "the military" means setting thousands of units forth 
in a coordinated way. Branches of the military must be 
coordinated. Other departments must be engaged. Public and 
private actors must be harnessed to common action. Coalition 
partners must be brought into a common endeavor. Delicate 
political arrangements and sensibilities must be translated into 
practical limits-and authorizations-for using force. 
Think back to the negotiations last summer over the United 
Nations force in Lebanon. At issue were the "rules of 
engagement"-who could do what? When? To whom? For 
politicians who will take the heat, it is important to know just how 
trigger-happy-or "forward leaning"-the soldiers at the tip of the 
spear will be. 
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Operating across dozens of jurisdictions, today's military must 
comply with innumerable local, national, and international rules 
regulating the use of territory, the mobilization of men, the 
financing of arms and logistics, and the deployment of force. If 
you want to screen banking data in Belgium, or hire operatives in 
Pakistan or refuel your plane in Kazakhstan, you need to know the 
law of the place. 
Baron de lomini famously defined strategy as "the art of 
making war upon the map." Maps are not only representations of 
physical terrain. They are also legal constructs-maps of powers, 
jurisdictions, liabilities, rights and duties. 
Law is perhaps the most visible part of military life when it 
priv\leges the killing and destruction of battle. If you kill this way, 
and not that, here and not there, these people and not those-what 
you do is privileged. If not, it is criminal. And the war must itself 
be legal. Domestically, that means within the President's 
constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief. Internationally, it 
means in compliance with the U.N. Charter and not waged for a 
forbidden purpose, like "aggression" or "genocide." 
Lawyers have long known that using law is also to invoke 
violence-the violence that stands behind legal authority. But the 
reverse is also true. To use violence is to invoke the law, the law 
that stands behind war, legitimating and permitting violence. 
Battlefield conduct is disciplined by rules: kill soldiers, not 
civilians; respect the rights of neutrals; do not use forbidden 
weapons; and "don't shoot until you see the whites of their eyes." 
Behind the rules stand general principles: no "unnecessary" 
damage; any killing or injury must be ''proportional'' to the 
military objective; and defend yourself. Together, these principles 
have become a global vernacular for assessing the legitimacy of 
war, down to the tactics of particular battles. Was the use of force 
"necessary" and "proportional" to the military objective-were the 
civilian deaths truly "collateral?" Military lawyers today are often 
forward-deployed with the troops poring over planned targets. 
The vocabulary legitimating targeting and proportionate 
violence has been internalized by the military. Not every soldier, 
nor every commander, follows the rules. But this is less surprising 
than the fact that people on all sides discuss the legitimacy of 
battlefield violence in similar legal terms. 
This common vernacular has also leeched into our political life. 
If war remains, as Clausewitz taught us, "the continuation of 
politics by other means," the politics continued by warfare today 
has itself been legalized. The sovereign no longer stands alone, 
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deciding the fate of the empire-he stands rather atop a complex 
bureaucracy, exercising powers delegated by a constitution, and 
shared with myriad agencies, bureaucracies and private actors, knit 
together in complex networks that spread across borders. Even in 
today's most powerful and well-integrated states, power lies in the 
capillaries of social and economic life. 
To say that the Pentagon reports to the President as 
Commander-in-Chief is a plausible, if oversimplified description 
of the organizational chart. But it is not a good description of 
Washington, D.C. There are the intelligence agencies, the 
President's own staff, the political consultants and focus groups. 
Born alone, die alone, perhaps-but sovereigns do not decide 
alone. The bureaucracies resist, the courts resist, and the dead 
weight of inertia must be overcome. 
Political leaders act today in the shadow of a knowledgeable, 
demanding, engaged, and institutionally entrenched national and 
global elite. As a result, expert consensus can and does influence 
the politics of war--consensus, for example, that Iraq had weapons 
of mass destruction, or that American credibility was on the line. 
The assessments of background elites are matters of ideological 
commitment and professional judgment-they can be incredibly 
stable, outlasting one leader after another, like the broad American 
consensus about the importance of "containing" the Soviet Union 
throughout the Cold War period. But elite opinion can also 
change-sometimes quite rapidly. This was clearly visible in the 
fallout from the prisoner abuse scandals in the Iraq war. They 
affected the political status of forces among elites debating all 
manner of broad and narrow issues related to the conflict and 
America's place in the world. Indeed, the global political system is 
a fragmented and unsystematic network of institutions, often only 
loosely understood or coordinated by national governments. 
Law has become the common vernacular of this dispersed elite, 
even as they argue about just what the law permits and forbids. 
This is what has led opponents of the Iraq conflict (or 
Guantanamo) so often to frame their opposition in legal terms-
what you are doing is illegal. 
So much for war as a legal institution. 
II. MODERN LAW: ANTIFORMALISM AND LEGAL 
PLURALISM 
Before considering the opportunities-and dangers-opened up 
by the legalization of war, we need to understand two aspects of 
modem law: its antiformalism and its pluralism. 
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First, antiformalism. 
Two hundred years ago, international law was rooted in 
ethics-to think about the law of war was to meditate on 
considerations of right reason and natural justice. One hundred 
years ago, law had become far more a matter of formal rules, de-
linked from morality and rooted in sovereign will. At the end of 
the nineteenth century, law was proud of its disconnection from 
political, economic-and military-reality. 
Law stood outside the institutions it regulated, offering a 
framework of sharp distinctions and formal boundaries. War and 
peace were legally distinct, separated by a formal "declaration of 
war." For their killing to be privileged, warriors would need to be 
identifiable and stay on the battlefield. Protected persons would 
need to stay outside the domain of combat. 
In this spirit, lawyers wrote rules distinguishing combatants 
from non-combatants, belligerents from neutrals. As late as 1941, 
it seemed natural for the United States to begin a war with a formal 
declaration, as Congress did in response to Pearl Harbor. In the 
lead-up to both world wars, the United States carefully guarded its 
formal status as a "neutral" nation until war was declared. That 
Japan attacked the United States without warning-and without 
declaring war-in violation of our neutrality was a popular way of 
expressing outrage at the surprise attack. 
Humanitarian voices supported the legal separation of war and 
peace, and often continue to insist on the sharp distinction between 
civilian and combatant-. just as they emphasize the ethical and 
legal distinctiveness of warfare. For good or ill, this approach is 
simply no longer realistic. Warfare has changed, law has changed, 
and humanitarians have developed new tactics. 
For the humanitarian, doubt about an external strategy, sharply 
distinguishing the virtues of peace from the violence of war often 
begins when we recognize how easily moral clarity calls forth 
violence and justifies warfare, just as war can strengthen moral 
determination. Indeed, there seems to be some kind of feedback 
loop between our ethical convictions and our use of force. Great 
moral claims grow stronger when men and women kill and die in 
their name, and it is a rare military campaign today that is not 
launched for some humanitarian purpose. 
Ethical denunciation gets us into things on which we are not 
able to follow through-triggering intervention in Kosovo, 
Afghanistan, even Iraq, with humanitarian promises on which we 
cannot deliver. It can focus our attention in all the wrong places. 
After all, sexually humiliating, even torturing and killing prisoners 
2007] Modern War and Modern Law 181 
is probably not, ethically speaking, the worst or most shocking 
thing that has happened in Iraq-yet the law of war focuses our 
outrage there. 
We know that formal rules can often get taken too far. Is it 
sensible, for example, to clear the cave with a firebomb because 
tear gas, lawful when policing, is unlawful in "combat?" Absolute 
rules lead us to imagine that we know what violence is just, what 
unjust, always and for everyone. But justice is not like that. It 
must be imagined, built by people, struggled for, and redefined in 
each conflict in new ways. Justice requires leadership--on the 
battlefield and off. 
F or all these reasons, humanitarians also tried to get inside the 
thinking of the military profession. The International Committee 
of the Red Cross ("ICRC") has always prided itself on its 
pragmatic relationship with military professionals. It is not 
unusual to hear military lawyers speak of the ICRC lawyers as 
their "partners" in codification-and compliance-and vice versa. 
They attend the same conferences, and speak the same language-
even when they differ on this or that detail. As external 
expressions of virtue became internal expressions of professional 
discipline, formal distinctions gave way to more flexible and 
pragmatic standards of judgment. 
ICRC lawyers worked with the military to codify rules the 
military could live with-wanted to live with. No exploding 
bullets. Respect for ambulances and medical personnel dressed 
like this, and so forth. Of course, this reliance on military 
acquiescence limited what could be achieved-military leaders 
outlaw weapons which they no longer need, which they feel will be 
potent tools only for their adversaries, or against which defense 
would be too expensive or difficult. Moreover, narrowly drawn 
rules permit a great deal-and legitimate what is permitted. 
As a result, the detailed rules of The Hague or Geneva 
Conventions were transposed into broad standards-like 
"proportionality"-that call for more contextual assessments, and 
can be printed on a wallet-sized card for soldiers in the field. "The 
means of war are not unlimited," "each use of force must be 
necessary"-these have become ethical baselines for a universal 
modem civilization. 
At the same time, the sharp distinction between war and peace, 
the need for a "declaration," even the legal status of "neutral" were 
abandoned. The U.N. Charter replaces the word "war" with more 
nuanced-and vague-terms like "intervention," "threats to the 
peace" or the "use of armed force," which trigger one or another 
institutional response. 
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This did not happen in a vacuum-it was part of a widespread 
loss of faith in the formal distinctions of classical legal thought-in 
the wisdom, as well as the plausibility, of separating law sharply 
from politics, or private right sharply from public power. Indeed, 
the modem law of force represents a triumph for grasping the 
nettle of costs and benefits and infiltrating the background 
decision-making of those whom it would bend to humanitarian 
ends. The result was a new, modem law in war. 
In this new framework, humanitarians often try to expand the 
scope of narrow rules by speaking of them in the broad language of 
principles. Military professionals have done the same thing for 
other reasons-to ease training through simplification, to 
emphasize the importance of judgment by soldiers and 
commanders, or simply to cover situations not included under the 
formal rules with a consistent practice. For example, a standard 
Canadian military manual instructs that the "spirit and principles" 
of the international law of armed conflict apply to non-
international conflicts not covered by the terms of the agreed rules. 
It is not just that rules have become principles-we just as often 
find the reverse. Military lawyers turn broad principles and 
nuanced judgments into simple bright line rules of engagement for 
soldiers in combat. Humanitarians comb military handbooks and 
government statements of principle promulgated for all sorts of 
purposes, to distill "rules" of customary international law. The 
ICRC's recent three-volume restatement of the customary law of 
armed conflict is a monumental work of advocacy of just this type. 
Law's century-long revolt against formalism has been 
successful. More than the sum of the rules, law has become a 
vocabulary for political judgment, action, and communication. At 
the same time, however, the modem law of armed conflict has 
become a confusing mix of distinctions that can melt into air when 
we press on them too firmly. "War" has become "self-defense," 
"hostilities," "the use of force," "resort to arms," "police action," 
"peace enforcement," "peace-making," "peace-keeping." It is 
hard to remember which is which-like "chop," "whip," "blend" 
on the kitchen Cuisinart. 
Ours is a law of firm rules and loose exceptions, of foundational 
principles and counter-principles. Indeed, law now offers the 
rhetorical-and doctrinal-tools to make and unmake the 
distinction betwe.en war and peace. As a result, the boundaries of 
war can now be managed strategically. 
Take the difficult question-when does war end? The answer is 
not to be found in law or fact-but in strategy. Declaring the end 
of hostilities might be a matter of Election Theater or military 
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assessment. Just like announcing that there remains "a long way to 
go," or that the "insurgency is in its final throes." We should 
understand these statements as arguments. As messages-but also 
as weapons. Law-legal categorization-is a communication tool. 
And communicating the war is fighting the war. 
This is a war, this is an occupation, this is a police action, and 
this is a security zone. These are insurgents, those are criminals, 
these are illegal combatants, and so on. All these are claims with 
audiences, made for a reason. Increasingly, defining the battlefield 
is not only a matter of deployed force-but it is also a rhetorical 
and legal claim. 
Law provides a vernacular for making such claims about a 
battlespace in which all these things are mixed up together. Troops 
in the same city are fighting and policing and building schools. 
Restoring water is part of winning the war-the continuation of 
combat by other means. Private actors are everywhere-
insurgents who melt into the mosque, armed soldiers who tum out 
to work for private contractors. Freedom fighters dressed as 
refugees, special forces operatives dressing like natives, private 
contractors dressing like Arnold Schwarzenegger, and all the 
civilians running the complex technology and logistical chains 
"behind" modem warfare. Who is calling the shots? At one point, 
apparently, the Swiss company backing up life insurance contracts 
for private convoy drivers in Iraq imposed a requirement of 
additional armed guards if they were to pay on any claim, slowing 
the whole operation. 
In the confusion, we want to insist on a bright line. For the 
military, after all, defining the battlefield defines the privilege to 
kill. But aid agencies also want the guys digging the wells to be 
seen as humanitarians, not post-conflict combatants-privileged 
not to be killed. Defining the non-battlefield opens a "space" for 
humanitarian action. 
When we use the law strategically, we change it. The Red 
Cross changes it. AI-Jazeera changes it. CNN changes it-and the 
U.S. administration changes it. Humanitarians who seize on vivid 
images of civilian casualties to raise expectations about the 
accuracy of targeting are changing the legal fabric. When an 
Italian prosecutor decides to charge C.I.A. operatives for their 
alleged participation in a black operation of kidnapping and 
rendition, the law of the battlefield has shifted. 
In the Kosovo campaign, news reports of collateral damage 
often noted that coalition pilots could have improved their 
technical accuracy by flying lower-although this would have 
exposed their planes and pilots to more risk. The law of armed 
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conflict does not require you to fly low or take more risk to avoid 
collateral damage-it requires you to avoid superfluous injury and 
unnecessary suffering. But these news reports changed the legal 
context-it seemed "unfair." Humanitarians seized the moment-
developing various theories to demand "feasible compliance"-
holding the military to technically achievable levels of care. In 
conference after conference, negotiation after negotiation, 
representatives of the u.s. military have argued that this is simply 
not "the law." Perhaps not-but the effect of the legal claim on the 
political context for military action is hard to deny. 
As a result, strange as it may seem, there is now more than one 
law of armed conflict. Different nations---even in the same 
coalition-will have signed onto different treaties. The same 
standards look different if you anticipate battle against a 
technologically superior foe--or live in a Palestinian refugee camp 
in Gaza. Although we might disagree with one or the other 
interpretation, we must recognize that the legal materials are elastic 
enough to enable diverse interpretations. Amnesty International 
called Israeli attacks on Hezbollah "war crimes that give rise to 
individual criminal responsibility." Israel rejected the charge that 
it "acted outside international norms or international legality" and 
insisted that "you are legally entitled to target infrastructure that 
your enemy is exploiting for its military campaign." Who will 
judge? 
In the United States, the Supreme Court--or the ballot box-
might be the final arbiter. Does Guantanamo violate the law in 
war or is it, in fact, a legitimate exercise of the President's war 
power? Should the justices of the Supreme Court rule, they will 
have the fmal word. If they do not, there is always another 
election. 
On the international stage, there is only the "Court of World 
Public Opinion." As a lawyer, advising the military about the law 
of war means making a prediction about how people with the 
power to influence our success will interpret the legitimacy of our 
plans. What will our allies or our own citizenry say? If we will 
need the cooperation of citizens in Iraq, or Lebanon or Pakistan, 
what will they have to say? We have seen the cost in political 
legitimacy and international cooperation that comes when we play 
by rules others don't recognize. 
III. OPPORTUNITIES-FOR HUMANISTS AND MILITARY 
PROFESSIONALS 
It is easy to understand the virtues of a powerful legal 
vocabulary, shared by elites around the world, for judging the 
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violence of warfare. It is exciting to see law become the mark of 
legitimacy as legitimacy has become the currency of power. 
It is more difficult to see the opportunities this opens for the 
military professional to harness law as a weapon, or to understand 
the dark sides of war by law. But the humanist vocabulary of 
international law is routinely mobilized as a strategic asset in war. 
The American military have coined a word for this: "lawfare"-
law as a weapon, law as a tactical ally, law as a strategic asset, an 
instrument of war. 
Law can often accomplish what we might once have done with 
bombs and missiles: seize and secure territory, send messages 
about resolve and political seriousness, even break the will of a 
political opponent. When the military buys up commercial satellite 
capacity to deny it to an adversary-contract is their weapon. 
They could presumably have denied their adversary access to those 
pictures in many ways. When the United States uses the Security 
Council to certify lists of terrorists and force seizure of their assets 
abroad, they have weaponized the law. Those assets might also 
have been immobilized in other ways. 
It is not only the use of force that can do these things. Threats 
can sometimes work. And law often marks the line between what 
counts as the routine exercise of one's prerogative and a threat to 
cross that line and exact a penalty. 
This will take some getting used to. How should we feel when 
the military "legally conditions the battlefield" by informing the 
public that they are entitled to kill civilians, or when our political 
leadership justifies warfare in the language of human rights? 
We need to remember what it means to say that compliance 
with international law "legitimates." It means, of course, that 
killing, maiming, humiliating, and wounding people is legally 
privileged, authorized, permitted, and justified. 
In 1996, I traveled to Senegal as a civilian instructor with the 
Naval Justice School to train members of the Senegalese military 
in the laws of war and human rights. At the time, the U.S. military 
was the world's largest human rights training institution, operating 
in 53 countries, from Albania to Zimbabwe. As I recall it, our 
training message was clear: humanitarian law is not a way of 
being nice. Compliance will make your force interoperable with 
international coalitions and suitable for international peacekeeping 
missions. To work with us and use our weapons, your military 
culture must have parallel rules of operation and engagement to 
our own. 
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Most importantly, we insisteq, humanitarian law will make your 
military more effective-something you can sustain and proudly 
stand behind. There is something chilling here-what does it 
mean to build a culture of violence one can "proudly stand 
behind?" 
When we broke into small groups for simulated exercises, a 
regional commander asked "when you capture some guerrillas, 
isn't it better to place a guy's head on a stake for deterrence?" 
Well, no, we patiently explained-this will strengthen the hostility 
of villagers to your troops-and imagine what would happen if 
CNN were nearby. They alllaughed-of course, we would be sure 
to keep the press away. Ab, we said, but this is no longer possible. 
If you want to play on the international stage, you need to be 
ready to have CNN constantly by your side. You must place an 
imaginary CNN web cam on your helmet, or better, just over your 
shoulder. Not because force must be limited and not because CNN 
might show up-but because only force that can imagine itself to 
be seen can be enduring. An act of violence one can disclose and 
be proud of is ultimately stronger and more legitimate. Indeed, we 
might imagine calculating a CNN-effect, in which the additional 
opprobrium resulting from civilian deaths, discounted by the 
probability of it becoming known to relevant audiences, multiplied 
by the ability of that audience to hinder the continued prosecution 
of the war, will need to be added to the probable costs of the strike 
in calculating its proportionality and necessity-as well as its 
tactical value and strategic consequences. 
Law reminds the military professional of the landscape, and of 
the views, powers and vulnerabilities of all those who might 
influence the space of battle. Law frames the strategic question 
this way: who, understanding the law in what way, will be able to 
do what to affect our ongoing efforts? How, using what mix of 
behavior and assertion, can we transform the strategic situation to 
our advantage? These questions cannot be answered by a code of 
conduct. They require a complex social analysis of the dynamic 
interaction between ideas about the law and strategic objectives. 
Not all military professionals think of the law in these terms-
many are suspicious about embracing law as a strategic partner. 
When I was in corporate practice, I often saw the same suspicion 
among businessmen. Law, they said, was too rigid, looked back 
rather than forward. In their eyes, law was basically a bunch of 
rules and prohibitions-you figure out what you want to achieve, 
and then, if you have time, you can ask the lawyers to vet it to be 
sure no one gets in trouble. 
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But these businessmen were not getting all they could from 
their legal counsel. Neither are military commanders-or 
Presidents-who think of law as a set of formal limits to be gotten 
around. What is difficult for us to realize is that a war machine 
that used law more strategically might, in fact, be far more violent, 
more powerful, more, ... well, legitimate. 
Imagine a businessman contemplating a potential deal. 
Figuring out what law will govern the transaction requires a 
complex assessment of national and local laws and private 
arrangements, in whatever jurisdictions might seek to have-or 
simply tum out to have-transnational effects on the business. A 
good corporate lawyer will assess the impact of many legal 
regimes-who will want to regulate the transaction? Who will be 
able to do so? What rules will influence the transaction even 
absent enforcement? 
Savvy clients do not treat the law as static-they influence it. 
They forum shop. They structure their transactions to place 
income here, risks there. They internalize national regulations to 
shield themselves from liability. They lobby, they bargain for 
exceptions. Like businessmen, military planners routinely use the 
legal maps proactively to shape operations. When fighter jets 
scoot along a coastline, build to a package over friendly territory 
before crossing into hostile airspace, they are using the law 
strategically-as a shield, marker of safe and unsafe. 
We know that corporations often lobby hard to be regulated. 
The food and drug industry wants federal safety standards-to 
legitimate their products, defend against price competition from 
start-ups who do not invest in long term brand reputation, and to 
shield themselves from liability. They want to be able to claim: 
We complied with all applicable legal regulations, and if you died 
anyway, it is not our responsibility. Something parallel goes on for 
the military. 
IV. THE DARKER SIDE OF MODERN WAR AND MODERN 
LAW 
The role of American lawyers assessing the Bush 
Administration's approach to the treatment of detainees illustrates 
the difficulties. I confess I shuddered when I read the legal 
memoranda provided to our civilian and military leadership by the 
lawyers at the Justice Department. However tightly reasoned their 
conclusions, this was legal advice tone deaf to consequences and 
strategic possibilities. The inattention to reaction, persuasion, 
strategy and to the world of legal pluralism and asymmetric 
warfare was astonishing. Our best legal minds had analyzed the 
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legality of the President's proposed course of action as if this were 
something one could look up in a text and interpret with 
confidence. But we know that what can be done with words on 
paper can but rarely be done in the world of real politics and war. 
Politics and warfare are an altogether different medium for writing. 
It is altogether the legal advisor's task to assess risks and reactions. 
In the meantime, we have all learned how to argue for a stricter 
reading of international law. "Common Article 3" of the Geneva 
Convention has been all over the news. We hear arguments for a 
stricter reading rooted in ethics, in the practicalities of 
interrogation, in the requirements of an effective public diplomacy. 
Were I the judge, I have no doubt how I'd rule-but in the 
international system there is no judge. Or we are all judges. In 
such a world, I hope the President's counsel considered the impact 
on discipline in our own forces of announcing so permissive an 
interpretation of what might be done in secret, off the map. Or the 
effect on our enemies, our allies, and ourselves, of insisting so 
doggedly on our prerogatives. How did our assertions 
communicate American power? 
Of course people will be detained and interrogated in war. That 
there might be those on the battlefield who were neither privileged 
enemy combatants nor protected civilians has long been 
recognized. But what was our strategy in marking these detainees 
with a neologism-illegal combatant-flagging what we were 
doing as exceptional, extraordinary, new? Was it sensible to place 
such diverse detainees in a common legal status? Could our 
lawyers have helped us build a bridge between the criminal justice 
system and warfare-rather than a wall separating this contlict 
from the resources and habitual practices of each? Might they 
have used the problems of detention and interrogation to link 
offense abroad with defense at home-rather than stressing the sui 
generis nature of all that we do? 
The best corporate lawyers help their clients look forward to the 
next step--when we have gotten you into this deal, how will we 
get you out? What will happen when it goes wrong-what if the 
regulators don't buy it? What if the rules change? What if the 
business climate changes and you change your own mind about 
what to do? 
Did the lawyers crafting our war on terror worry about how we 
would unbuild Guantanamo and get these people out of this status? 
I'm afraid they worried more about establishing principles of 
authority and limits to legality than about the war their client was 
starting to fight. They strategized for the law-and for their ideas 
and legal theories about the President's authority-but not for the 
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nation. Of course, maybe they told their client what he wanted to 
hear-and perhaps he has offered the American public the war 
they wanted to fight. But we know that statesmen-and military 
commanders--can find themselves trapped in a bubble. So do 
businessmen. 
At its best, the law can be a great strategic mirror. How will 
this deal, this battle, this campaign, look in the eyes of the other? 
To think strategically is to treat the law as an index of reactions-
predictions, in Holmes' famous formulation, of "what the courts 
will decide in fact, and nothing more pretentious." It is far too 
soon to know what the court of public opinion, at home and 
abroad, will ultimately make of our strategy for the war on terror, 
and how that opinion will be translated into political power. My 
worry is that meanwhile, our nation's lawyers-and judges-have 
been asleep at the wheel. 
But the dangers inherent in the modem partnership of war and 
law go beyond bad lawyering. More significant, to my mind, is 
the loss of critical distance on the violence of war. As we all 
know, the U.N. Charter prohibited the use of force-except as 
authorized by the Charter itself. Not as authorized by the UN, but 
as authorized by the Charter. Like a constitution, the Charter was 
drafted in broad strokes and would need to be interpreted. Over 
the years, what began as an effort to monopolize force has become 
a constitutional regime of legitimate justifications for warfare. 
This system of principles has legitimated a great deal of 
warfare. Indeed, it is hard to think of a use of force that could not 
be legitimated in the language of the Charter. It is a rare statesman 
who launches a war simply to be aggressive. There is almost 
always something else to be said-the province is actually ours, 
our rights have been violated, our enemy is not, in fact, a state, we 
were invited to help, they were about to attack us, we are 
promoting the purposes and principles of the United Nations. 
Something. 
A parallel process has eroded the firewall between civilian and 
military targets-it is but a short step to what the military terms 
"effects based targeting." And why shouldn't military operations 
be judged by their effects, rather than by their adherence to narrow 
rules that might well have all manner of perverse and unpredictable 
outcomes? 
Indeed, I was struck during the N.A.T.O. bombardment of 
Belgrade-justified by the international community's humanitarian 
objectives in Kosovo-to hear discussions about targeting the 
civilian elites supporting the Milosevic regime. If bombing the 
bourgeoisie would have been more effective than a long march 
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inland toward the capital, would it have been proportional, 
necessary-humanitarian-to place the war's burden on young 
draftees in the field rather than upon the civilian population who 
sent them there? Might not targeting civilians supporting an 
outlaw-if democratic-regime extend the Nuremberg principle of 
individual responsibility? 
We must recognize that humanitarian idealism no longer 
provides a standpoint outside the ebbs and flows of political and 
strategic debate about how to achieve our objectives on the 
battlefield. 
Conversing before the "Court of World Public Opinion," 
statesmen not only assert their prerogatives-they also test and 
establish those prerogatives through action. Political assertions 
come armed with little packets of legal legitimacy-just as legal 
assertions carry a small backpack of political corroboration. As 
lawyers must harness enforcement to their norms, states must 
defend their prerogatives to keep them-states must back up their 
assertions with action to maintain their credibility. A great many 
military campaigns have been undertaken for just this kind of 
credibility-missiles become missives. 
The pragmatic assessment of wartime violence can be deeply 
disturbing. Take civilian casualties. Of course, civilians will be 
killed in war. Limiting civilian death has become a pragmatic 
commitment-no unnecessary damage, not one more civilian than 
necessary. In the vernacular of humanitarian law, no "superfluous 
injury," and no "unnecessary suffering." It is here that we find the 
military's public affairs teams preparing the way by explaining that 
they are entitled to kill-and expect to kill-civilians. 
You may remember Major General James Mattis, poised to 
invade Fallujah, concluding his demand that the insurgents stand 
down with these words: 
"We will always be humanitarian in all our efforts. 
We will fight the enemy on our terms. May God 
help them when we're done with them."! 
I know I shivered at his juxtaposition of humanitarian claims 
and blunt threats. 
We need to understand how this sounds-particularly when the 
law of armed conflict has so often been a vocabulary used by the 
rich to judge the poor. When the Iraqi insurgent quoted on the 
same page of the New York Times as Mattis threatened to 
decapitate civilian hostages if the coalition forces did not 
I. See w. Thomas Smith Jr., Dodge City, Iraq, NATIONAL REVIEW, April 12,2004. 
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withdraw, he was also threatening innocent civilian death-less of 
it actually-but without the humanitarian promise. And, of course, 
he also made me shiver. 
When the poor deviate from the best military practices of the 
rich, it is tempting to treat their entire campaign as illegitimate. 
But before we jump to the legitimacy of their cause, how should 
we evaluate the strategic use of perfidy by every outgunned 
insurgency battling a modem occupation army? That evaluation 
forces us to encounter the different ways these statements are 
received by all the publics with the capacity to influence the 
military operations. 
From an "effects-based" perspective, perfidious attacks on our 
military-from mosques, by insurgents dressing as civilians or 
using human shields-may have more humanitarian consequences 
than any number of alternative tactics the insurgents may have 
used. Perhaps more importantly, they are very likely to be 
interpreted by many as reasonable responses by a massively 
outgunned, but legitimate force. Indeed, even our own troops 
typically respond in at least two registers. In the first, it is all 
perfidy-the insurgents are barely recognizable as human, 
understand only force, know no boundaries. But we also find a 
common recognition that, as one soldier put it "what would I do if 
this were my town? How would I fight?-probably just as they are 
now." 
I am often asked how today's wars can be seen as "legal" when 
our opponents, the terrorists, respect no laws at all. Of course, the 
role law will play in our own campaign will be a function of our 
own values and our own strategy. But the surprising thing is the 
extent to which even opponents in today's asymmetric conflicts 
argue about tactics in a parallel vernacular-in Lebanon, everyone 
was citing U.N. resolutions and claiming their tactics were 
proportional, their opponents' perfidious. We should not be 
surprised to find various Palestinian factions differentiated by their 
interpretation of legitimate targets-Israeli civilians or only 
soldiers, in the territories or in Israel proper, and so forth. 
We will need to become more adept at operations in a world in 
which the image of a single dead civilian can make out a 
persuasive case that law has been violated-a case that trumps the 
most ponderous technical legal defense. At the same time, the 
legitimacy of wartime violence is all mixed up with the legitimacy 
of the war itself. If the use of force is to be proportional-more 
force for more important objectives-it seems reasonable to think 
there would be a sliding scale for more and less important wars. 
Wars for national survival, wars to stop genocide-shouldn't they 
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legitimate more than run-of-the-mill efforts to enforce U.N. 
resolutions? There can be something perverse here-harsher 
tactics more legitimate in more "humanitarian" campaigns. 
It is in this atmosphere that discipline has broken down in every 
asymmetric struggle, when neither clear rules nor broad standards 
of judgment seem adequate to moor one's ethical sense of 
responsibility and empowerment. 
In self-defense, we grant the most permissive rules of 
engagement. You hear about navy pilots briefed on all the 
technical rules of engagement, and then sent off with the 
empowering and permissive words "just don't get killed out 
there-defend yourselves, do what's necessary." At the same 
time, all sides assess their adversaries by the strictest standards. 
Technological asymmetry and legal pluralism leave everyone 
uncertain what, if any, rules apply to their own situation. Everyone 
has a CNN camera on their shoulder-but who is watching-the 
enemy, the civilians, your family at home, your commanding 
officer, your buddies? 
Soldiers, civilians, media commentators, politicians, all begin to 
lose their ethical moorings. We can surely see that it will be hard 
for any Iraqi-or Lebanese-mother to feel it was necessary and 
proportional to kill her son. "Why," she might well demand to 
know, "when America is so powerful and strong did you need to 
kill my son?" 
Here we can begin to see the dangers in turning the old 
distinction between combatants and civilians into a principle. But 
what can it mean for the distinction between military and civilian 
to have itself become a principle? The "principle of distinction"-
there is something oxymoronic here-either it is a distinction, or it 
is a principle. 
I have learned that if you ask a military professional-precisely 
how many civilians can you kill to offset how much risk to one of 
your own men?-you won't receive a straight answer. Indeed, at 
least so far as I have been able to ascertain, there is no background 
exchange rate for civilian life. What you fmd instead are rules 
kicking the decision up the chain of command as the number of 
civilians increases, until the decision moves offstage from military 
professionals to politicians. You expect more than 50 civilian 
casualties? Cheney'S office needs to be informed. 
As the law in war became a matter of standards, balancing, and 
pragmatic calculation, the difficult, discretionary decisions were 
exported to the political realm. But when they get there, they find 
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politicians seeking cover beneath the same legal formulations. 
Judgment, leadership, and responsibility are in short supply. 
In the early days of the Iraq war, coalition forces were certainly 
frustrated by Iraqi soldiers who advanced in the company of 
civilians. A Corporal Mikael McIntosh reported that he and a 
colleague had declined several times to shoot soldiers in fear of 
harming civilians. "It's a judgment call." He said, "If the risks 
outweigh the losses, then you don't take the shot." He offered an 
example: "There was one Iraqi soldier, and 25 women and 
children, I didn't take the shot." His colleague, Sergeant Eric 
Schrumpf chipped in to describe facing one soldier among two or 
three civilians, opening fire, and killing civilians: "We dropped a 
few civilians, but what do you do. I'm sorry, but the chick was in 
the way." 
There is no avoiding decisions of this type in warfare. The 
difficulty arises when humanitarian law transforms decisions about 
whom to kill into judgments. When it encourages us to think the 
chick's death resulted not from an exercise of human freedom, for 
which a moral being is responsible, but rather from the abstract 
operation of professional principles. 
We know there are clear cases both ways--destroying the 
village to save it, or minor accidental damage en route to victory-
but we also know that the principles are most significant in the 
great run of situations that fall in between. What does it mean to 
pretend these decisions are principled judgments? It can mean a 
loss of the experience of responsibility--command responsibility, 
ethical responsibility, political responsibility. 
I was struck that Iraq war reporting was filled with anecdotes 
about soldiers overcome by remorse at having slaughtered 
civilians-and being counseled back to duty by their officers, their 
chaplains, their mental health professionals, who explained that 
what they had done was necessary, proportional, and therefore just. 
Of course, if you ask leading humanitarian law experts how 
many civilians you can kill for this or that, you will also not get an 
answer. Rather than saying "it's a judgment call," however, they 
are likely to say something like "you just can't target civilians"-
thereby refusing to engage in the pragmatic assessments necessary 
to make that rule applicable in combat. In psychological terms, it 
is hard to avoid interpreting this pragmatism-promised-but-not-
delivered as anything other than denial. It is a collaborative 
denial-by humanitarians and military lawyers-of their 
responsibility for the decisions inherent in war. Indeed, the 
greatest threat posed by the merger of law and war is loss of the 
human experience of moral jeopardy in the face of death, 
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mutilation, and all the other horrors of warfare. Whatever 
happened was legitimate, proportional, necessary. Wherever 
responsibility lies-it lies elsewhere. It lies with the civilian 
command, with the bad apples among the troops, with the 
peregrinations of an ineffective diplomacy, or with the enemy, 
with the enemies of civilization itself. 
v. CONCLUSION 
Let me conclude. War has become a legal institution. Law has 
become a flexible strategic instrument for military and 
humanitarian professionals alike. As such, law may do more to 
legitimate than restrain violence. It may accelerate the vertigo of 
combat and contribute to the loss of ethical moorings for people on 
all sides of a conflict. We modernized the law of war to hold those 
who use violence politically responsible. That is why we applaud 
law as a global vernacular of "legitimacy." 
Unfortunately, however, the experience of political 
responsibility for war has proved elusive. Recapturing a politics of 
war would mean feeling the weight of the decision to kill or let 
live. Most professionals flee from this experience. But citizens 
flee from this experience as well. We have all become adept in the 
language of war and law. We all yearn for the reassurance of an 
external judgment-by political leaders, clergy, lawyers and 
others-that what we have gotten up to is, in fact, an ethically 
responsible national politics. 
In a sense, the commander who offloads responsibility for 
warfare to the civilian leadership is no different than the foot 
soldier who blames the officers, the lawyer who faults the rules, or 
the citizen who repeats what he heard on the evening news. 
Clausewitz was right-war is the continuation of political 
intercourse. When we make war, humanitarian and military 
professionals together, let us experience politics as our vocation 
and responsibility as our fate. 
Thank you-I look forward to your comments. 
